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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
INSURANCE: NEW DEFINITIONS AND
GUIDELINES REGARDING MEDICAL QUESTIONS
IN LIFE INSURANCE APPLICATIONS
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen,' a recent Okla-
homa case, recovery was allowed under a life insurance policy even
though there were both a knowing misrepresentation in the appli-
cation and a failure to disclose a recent biopsy. This was an action
for the cancellation of a life insurance policy in which the de-
fendant beneficiary filed a cross-petition seeking recovery on the
policy. The court reaffirmed a well-known doctrine, discredited a
company argument in the face of the facts, and laid down new
guidelines in the area of medical definitions.
Three distinct aspects were presented: first, an agent falsified
material information in the application; second, the company con-
tended that they could have discovered a disease which competent
doctors had been unable to discover; and third, there was uncer-
tainty as to whether a biopsy could be considered to be surgery.
It has long been an established principle of insurance law that
an intentional misrepresentation of health material to the assump-
tion of risk in an application for a life insurance policy is a ground
for cancelling the policy and denying the beneficiary any recovery
under it.' Likewise, failure to disclose the whole truth has been
held tantamount to giving false information
The existing Oklahoma law regarding misrepresentations in
applications for insurance policies provides that such false state-
ments will not bar recovery unless they materially affect the ac-
ceptance of risk or hazard' or are fraudulent or conceal facts which
would cause the insurer not to issue the policy without allowing
'Massachussetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 416 P.2d 935 (Okla.
1965).
2Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Shipley, 134 S.W.2d 342, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939);
Kirk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 675,-, 81 S.W. 2d 333(1935), Texas Nat'l Life Ass'n v. Bailey, 54 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932), (dicta).
3National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 211 Ky. 12, 276 S.W. 981,(1925).
4OKLA. STAT. tit 36, § 4407 C (1961).
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for the additional facts!
The decedent insured told the company's agent, on application,
that he had had a recent case of infectious mononucleosis, for the
diagnosis and treatment of which he had consulted a physician,
been hospitalized, and had X-rays and blood tests. The agent, in
filling in answers contained in the application, answered in the
negative all questions pertaining to whether the applicant had a
recent history of medical consultation, hospitalization, X-ray, or
serious illness. The insured questioned the propriety of entering
such answers in the application and offered to submit to a physical
examination if the agent thought it was necessary. The agent
concluded that the information was irrelevant since Evans' doctor
had dismissed him even though the company required an examina-
tion before issuing a policy applied for within three years of re-
covery from mononucleosis. The court said that since the agent
knew the actual facts, the company should be charged with notice
of those facts' and that delivery of the policy under those circum-
stances bound the company.!
It further appeared from the testimony that Evans had failed
to disclose the fact that he had had a lymph node removed from
his neck for purposes of biopsy. The company insisted that this
was "surgery" as contemplated in the application questionnaire
and that if they had known of this "surgery" they would have
discovered Hodgkin's disease.
The Court rejected the company's argument that they would
have made this discovery. The testimony showed that the biopsy
was, in fact, taken to determine whether Evans had Hodgkin's
disease. The pathologist who examined the lymph node testified
IOKLA. STAT. tir. 36, § 2609 (1961).
'Supra note 1, at 940.7Supra note 1, at 940. With respect to the facts so far presented, the
company's only remedy appears to be against the agent for issuing the
policy contrary to instructions. There is authority supporting the rule
that where an agent issues a policy contrary to his instructions he may
be held liable for the loss which the company has to pay. Manufacutrer's
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Martin-Lebreton Ins. Agency, 242 F. 2d 951, (5th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870 (1957); American Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Seymour, 144 So. 755, (La. 1932); Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Seegers, 192 Ala. 103, 68 So. 902 (1915).
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"... that there was no diagnosis he could make as to any...
Hodgkins [sicl disease involved."' The court then ruled, "The
findings of [the doctors] . .. render[s] Company's argument
that they would have discovered Hodgkins [sic] disease incon-
clusive. The test is whether insurance companies generally would
have rejected the application."'
The company also introduced evidence which tended to show
the cause of Evan's death was Marfan's disease. The court found
no evidence that Evans knew of, or was ever suspected of having
Marfan's disease.
At this point it will be helpful to make a brief comparative
analysis of the medical disorders involved. Infectious mononucleo-
sis is "... characterized by a sudden onset and acute course, with
fever and inflammatory swelling of the lymph nodes, especially
those of the cervical [neck] region.""0 Hodgkin's disease is "[a]
painless, progressive, and fatal enlargement of the lymph nodes,
spleen, and general lymphoid tissues, which often begins in the
neck and spreads over the body."" Marfan's syndrome is "(a)
congenital and hereditary condition ... ,,, characterized by a tend-
ency to great height, long and thin distal extremities, funnel chest,
deep-set eyes, muscular weakness, scanty subcutaneous fat, ocular
abnormalities, and cardiac abnormalities and failure)
It is seen that infectious mononucleosis and Hodgkin's disease
have great similarities in sign and symptom. Both involve the
lymphatic system. Both infectious mononucleosis and early Hodg-
kin's disease are characterized by a swelling of the lymph nodes
in the neck region. It is quite reasonable that a doctor, in making
a diagnosis of either of these two diseases, would seriously consider
the possibility of the existence of the other.
'Supra note 1, at 941.
9New York Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 154 Okla. 244, 7 P.2d 440 as cited
by the Court (1932), in Allen, supra note 1, at 941.
lo DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATm MEDICAL DICnloNARY 854 (W. B. Saunders
Co.: Phila. 1957).
"Id. at 397
'lid. at 1347.
13Tung & Liebow, Marfaen's Syndfome, 1 LAB. INVESTIGATION 382,
(1952).
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On the other hand the characteristics of Marfan's syndrome,
the malady which the company appeared to believe caused Evan's
death, are seen to be quite distinctly different from and generally
unrelated to any prior sign relating to the company's acceptance
of the risk. "There is no evidence that Evans had ever heard of
the disease or that any doctor had though of the disease in con-
nection with Evans until after his death."' 4 In the light of this state-
ment there is great doubt as to whether a company examination
would or could have revealed this malady which, if Evans had
had it at all, he had had since birth, and which had not been dis-
covered by even as thorough an examination as was made in con-
nection with his case of infectious mononucleosis. It is settled
law that an applicant cannot be required to disclose a latent disease
of which he has no knowledge."5
The court properly found little strength in the company's
argument that on its own examination it would have discovered
facts which might have materially affected the assumption of risk.
It appears that the company's only escape from liability would
have been for it to prove that the very fact of the biopsy was
material to the assumption of risk. If the company could have
shown that its policy was not to write a life insurance policy for
anyone who had had a biopsy it might well have been able to
cancel the policy on the ground of concealment of facts. A less
forceful argument, but one more likely to be in keeping with the
company's policy, would have been to prove that the company
would not have issued the policy in as large an amount had they
known of the biopsy. Either of the above arguments would have
placed the case squarely within the Oklahoma statute, which al-
lows the prevention of recovery where a "... concealment of facts
[isi . . . [material... to the acceptance of the risk ... or...
Itlhe insurer in good faith would.., not have issued the policy
in as large an amount... if the true facts had been made known
to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy
or otherwise.""
4 Supra note 1, at 941.
111d. United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 175 Okla. 25, 51 P.2d 963,(1935); National Life & Acc Ins. Co. v. Wicker, 171 Okla. 241, 42
P.2d 50, 100 A.L.R. 357 (1935), National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Shermer, 161 Okla. 77, 17 P. 2d 401 (1932).
'
6OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3609 (1961).
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Through an exercise in semantics the court rejected the com-
pany's argument that the biopsy was surgery. The court formu-
lated a definition of surgical operation as "... . a procedure carried
out on a living body for effecting a cure by altering an existing
state or condition, as distinguished from medical."'1 The court
also proffered a definition of biopsy as "... . the removal of tissue,
cells, or fluids from the living body for examination or study for
diagnostic purposes.""' The court then went on to conclude, "It
is doubtful if the ordinary person would have considered this
biopsy as 'surgery.' ,9
It is extremely important to note that these definitions may be
applied to future cases. It is a general rule in the field of insurance
law that policies should be construed so as to avoid forfeiture,0 and
it has been inferred that diagnostic work in a hospital is not
"treatment" as contemplated in a life insurance application." In
the light of these observations, therefore, the definitions given by
the court were fully adequate to resolve the controversy before it
by expressing doubt that "... . the ordinary person would have
considered this biopsy as 'surgery.' "' It should be noted, however,
that very little attention was paid to these definitions in the
opinion and no authority was cited for either.
The definition of surgery as "... . a procedure carried out on a
living body for effecting a cure by altering an existing abnormal
state or condition, as distinguished from medical"' leaves much
room for procedures outside the realm of surgery as viewed by
the ordinary man. Under the court's definition a doctor who re-
turns a dislocated shoulder to its normal position would be per-
forming "surgery." He has done a non-medical "procedure" on a
"living body." He has effected a "cure by altering an existing
'
1Supra note 1, at 941.
,Sapra note 1, at 941.
"Supra note 1, at 941.
"Missouri State Life Ins. v. Carey, 262 S.W. 864, (Tex. Civ. App.
1924); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 219 S.W. 254 (1920),
(dicta).
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hub Hosiery Mills, 170 F.2d 547, (1st Cir. 1948),
(dicta).
'Sapra note 1, at 941.
Supra note 1, at 941.
[Vol. 4, No. 2
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abnormal state or condition." Likewise, a father who slaps his
choking three-year-old infant on the back, causing him to cough
up a button he has accidentally inhaled, would be considered to
have performed "surgery." It is submitted that an ordinary man
would not consider these procedures to be "surgery." A reasonable
definition of surgery by an ordinary man would be: A procedure,
in the general field of healing, involving an incision.
Biopsy has been defined as ". . . a microscopic examination
of a piece of tissue removed from the infected and questioned
diseased region.. ..".24 A lymph node biopsy certainly requires an
incision, is usually carried out in an operating room, and the ex-
cision is generally performed by a surgeon. Such a procedure falls
squarely within the ordinary man's definition as proffered. The
procedure involved in applying an ordinary man's definition of
a biopsy in conjunction with a definition of surgery which varies
widely from that of the ordinary man is highly questionable.
Ruling in this case, the court had added strength to the doc-
trine that notice to an insurance agent is considered to be notice
to the company, regardless of whether the agent actually com-
municated his knowledge to the company.
The discrediting of the company's argument that, had it been
able to examine the applicant, it would have discovered a specific
disease, is subject to two interpretations. First, the court has al-
lowed the opinion of an expert witness to represent the opinion
of the entire class of which he is a member. Second, the unsup-
ported assertion that the company could have discovered a specific
disease does not stand without discrediting the medical testimony
of the docors who said the applicant did not have the disease.
The court's definition of surgery, together with the rationale
applied in conjunction with it, is not of sufficient technical quality
and clarity to be applied to future cases without elaboration, quali-
fication, and distinguishment. Counsel presented with this problem
in the future would be well-advised to employ additional ma-
terials and use further insights in order to achieve the certainty
needed in this area.
James N. Palik
uU.S. v. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic, 198 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1952).
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